The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power

TLDR

Legislative committees are strategically central, serving as agenda setters and wielding power through bill origination and conference‑stage revisions, yet explanations for their influence remain largely empirical. The study seeks to explain why committees are powerful. The authors develop a rational‑choice model that foregrounds the legislative sequence to explain committee power. The model yields a theory of conference politics, supported by evidence from recent Congresses.

Abstract

Legislative committees have fascinated scholars and reformers for more than a century. All acknowledge the central strategic position of committees in legislatures. The consensus, however, centers on empirical regularities and stylized facts, not on explanations. We seek to explain why committees are powerful. We formulate an institutionally rich rational-choice model of legislative politics in which the sequence of the legislative process is given special prominence. Committees, as agenda setters in their respective jurisdictions, are able to enforce many of their policy wishes not only because they originate bills but also because they get a second chance after their chamber has worked its will. This occurs at the conference stage in which the two chambers of a bicameral legislature resolve differences between versions of a bill. A theory of conference politics is offered and some evidence from recent Congresses is provided.