Beyond the Arab Cold War: The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962–68

Noel Brehony

Bustan The Middle East Book Review · 2018 · 46 citations · 0 references

Concepts

Abstract

In reading this excellent study, something that stands out is the parallels that exist between the Yemeni civil war of the 1960s and the Yemeni civil war that began in March 2015. Armies in Yemen are currently fighting over the same ground that they fought over in that earlier conflict, dealing with the same obstacles formed by Yemen's mountainous terrain, and using and confronting determined tribal fighters—just as they did in the 1960s. There are other striking similarities: Orkaby quotes a Royalist tribesman who said he could use only fifty bullets to hit fifty of their Egyptian opponents, which is reminiscent of a Yemeni army commander in 2018 who told a journalist how a well-placed sniper at the top of a valley could kill 100 of his soldiers. In both wars, one side had complete control of the air. But in neither the 1960s nor the current conflict has the side with air supremacy been able to use its advantage to bring a swift end to the war. One major difference is that Egypt deployed its own ground troops—up to 70,000 at its peak—but the Saudi-led coalition has left the ground fighting to Yemenis, whom it trains, equips, pays, and supports, apart from direct involvement of UAE troops in the south, which until November 30, 1967, was still under British control.As the title suggests, the author does not see regional rivalries of the Arab Cold War—to borrow the famous terminology of Malcom Kerr—as being alone sufficient for explaining what caused the Yemeni civil war of the 1960s.1 Rather, the causes of the war lay in Yemen's recent history: the civil war was “a struggle for Yemeni nationalism, nation-building, and Pan-Arab unity and rhetoric, rather than merely a proxy war between regional rivals”—or the protagonists of the Cold War. As the conflict progressed, Yemenis were “not masters of their identity,” and their country became “an open field for individuals, organizations and countries to peddle their agenda … laying the foundation for subsequent decades of Yemeni and Arabian history” (1). The present conflict is sometimes portrayed—not least by the Saudi-led coalition—as part of a regional struggle with Iran, a country that does in fact provide some support to the Houthis. But, in reality, the war is primarily a conflict between Yemenis, and regional and international powers have merely been drawn into it.Imam Yahya—following his defeat and the loss of Asir to Ibn Saud in 1934—started to build a national army in order to defend his regime and to reduce his dependence on the fickle loyalty of tribal militias. The new army's officer corps was from a new generation of Yemenis educated abroad, who absorbed the nationalist, socialist, and revolutionary ideas of the post–Second World War period. Cairo became a center for Yemeni opposition figures. Attempted coups in 1948 and 1955 may have been led by members of the Imam's family, but they included support from members of the new generation, including two young men who later became presidents of the Yemen Arab Republic.In the book's first chapter, the author examines the role of Egypt in the 1962 coup. The coup came at a time when many Arabs were rejecting President Nasser's nationalism, seeing it as an Egyptian aspiration to dominate the Arab world. The first years of the 1960s saw a series of setbacks to Nasser's political program: Syria's secession from the United Arab Republic took place in 1961, followed by the Baʾathist coups in Damascus and Baghdad in 1963. Yemen offered Nasser an opportunity to reverse course and reassert his leadership in the region: he could use a pro-Egyptian Yemen to intimidate Saudi Arabia and drive the British out of southern Yemen, which at the time was Britain's last remaining bastion in the Middle East. There were factors working in Nasser's favor: Imam Ahmad bin Yahya's son, Badr, had been an admirer and protégé of Nasser. And, in addition, Egypt had good contacts with the emerging group of young Yemen leaders, including the Famous Forty, which was associated with the Free Yemen Movement (FYM). Orkaby argues convincingly that the 1962 coup, which was arranged a few days after Badr had become Imam, was not planned in Cairo—as is sometimes asserted. Instead, Orkaby argues that the Egyptians had determined that the coup was inevitable, and that they were in a position to react decisively to support it, albeit initially under the mistaken assumption that Badr had been killed in the coup. Orkaby concludes that “the FYM laid the foundations of September 1962 well before Nasser came to power, and it was primarily responsible for its own nationalist revolution” (15).Egypt saw its intervention as a limited short-term response to consolidate the new Yemeni regime. Yemen's new head of state, Abdullah al-Sallal, invoked the Treaty of Jeddah, which Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen had signed in 1956, even though its wording seemed to preclude such a move. Cairo soon realized that both the new regime and its forces would not survive without Egyptian military support. What they failed to understand was that Egyptian forces that had been trained to fight Israel in the Sinai would be unprepared for the mountain warfare and guerrilla tactics they faced in Yemen. Egyptian generals had little knowledge of the tribes, which they disdained, and they did not grasp how crucial tribal support would be for the security of any regime in Sanaʾa—something just as true in 2018 as it was in 1962. Fortuitously, the leaders of the two main tribal confederations—the Hashid and Bakil—held their own grudges against the Imam's family, and they helped the new regime to establish itself. After escaping from Sanaʾa, Badr made his way northward, and later rallied tribal support and appealed for Saudi intervention under the Treaty of Taif, which had been signed after the end of hostilities in the 1934 Saudi–Yemeni War. Badr's escape is reminiscent of an episode from the current Yemeni civil war: in early 2015 President Hadi fled from Houthi-controlled Sanaʾa to Aden, where he later called for Saudi Arabia to intervene.The Soviet Union (chapter 2) had also cultivated Badr before the coup and had invested in Yemen—especially in Hodeidah—as part of its strategy to extend its naval presence into the Red Sea and beyond. Al-Sallal's regime offered an even better opportunity for the Soviets to achieve their goals, and it did so by supporting Egyptian intervention, which also served Moscow's interests in Cairo. Once US leaders had managed to find Yemen on a map, they decided to recognize the new regime—to the chagrin of the British—in December 1962, calculating that by helping Nasser they might prevent Russia from establishing a stronger foothold in Yemen.2 The United States placated Saudi concerns by posting US aircraft to the kingdom. As Orkaby argues, “each party peddled its own agenda” and “no external power or political entity exercised decisive control over local events” (57).In chapter 3, the author adds a unique perspective by examining Egyptian military manuals captured by Israel in the Sinai in 1967. Egypt's investment of men, treasure, and weapons contributed to a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. Victories on the battlefield were followed by offers to negotiate ceasefires to consolidate gains. An early success for the Egyptians was the capture of Saʾada city before the end of 1962, but their position was undermined by the failure to dislodge Royalist forces from key positions in the mountains around the city. A Royalist counteroffensive prevented any further advances. The Egyptians could not count on the consistent loyalty of tribal militias fighting for al-Sallal. They were more interested in using the weapons they received to achieve their own objectives.Field Marshall ʿAbd al-Hakim Amer envisioned Yemen as his “military fiefdom” (Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian presidents that succeeded Nasser, also served in Yemen).3 In 1963 Amer aimed to secure the strategic triangle of Sanaʾa, Taʾizz and Hodeidah, by using air power and artillery to push the Royalists away from the area.4 The Royalists gradually adapted their strategy to make the best use of the terrain to neutralize Egyptian power and to tie down increasing numbers of Egyptian forces. They eventually compelled the Egyptians to adopt what became known as the “long breath strategy,” which entailed devoting all their resources to securing the triangle. (As Orkaby argues in chapter 5 of the book, the triangle became Nasser's cage.)International attempts to broker peace or a prolonged ceasefire are discussed in chapter 4. In the chapter, Orkaby draws on new materials from UN and Canadian archives in order to cast in a more favorable light what are generally perceived to be the failures of the United Nations Yemen Observer Mission. The purpose of UNYOM was to observe the withdrawal of troops agreed to in negotiations. The problem was that no withdrawals took place and there was little to observe. Neither side intended to give up on the war: they were only pausing to catch their breath. Supporting the central thesis of Orkaby's book, when peace negotiations began to take place starting in late 1964, they were initiated not by the Egyptians or the Saudis, but by the Yemeni protagonists. On the Republican side, there was an emerging “Third Force” which included leading figures from the Hashid and Bakil. The Third Force wanted not only to end a ruinous war, but also the reform of al-Sallal's regime and the early departure of increasingly unpopular Egyptian forces. Among its leaders were Qadi ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Iryani, who succeeded al-Sallal as president of Yemen in 1967, and Muhammad al-Zubayri, whose assassination in April 1965 led to threats from the Hashid and Bakil to march on Sanaʾa. A conference was arranged in Khamir in May 1965 to try to form a united Yemen that excluded Egypt and put limits on the power of al-Sallal. Leaders of the Third Force were invited to Cairo for negotiations, but they were afterwards incarcerated in the Egyptian capital for the rest of the war.Nasser, who was concerned about the cost of keeping 70,000 troops in Yemen at a time when Egypt's domestic economy was increasingly stressed, needed to reinforce his army in the Sinai for an expected confrontation with Israel, which would eventually come in June 1967. In the meantime, King Faisal, who was growing in confidence thanks in part to Western arms contracts, was able to increase his pressure on Egypt in Yemen. The two leaders negotiated another Treaty of Jeddah on August 23, 1965, under which Faisal agreed to cut support to the Royalists and Nasser agreed to withdraw his troops. Within a few weeks it collapsed: Egyptian withdrawals halted, and hostilities resumed.Regional and international players could see that Yemen had become Egypt's Vietnam. Even so, Nasser decided to stay when, in April 1966, the British announced that they would leave South Yemen by 1968. It gave him the opportunity to portray himself as someone who was hounding the British and forcing them out of the south. Egyptian support—training, arms, money, and intelligence—to the National Liberation Front and to its rival, the Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South, had begun soon after the arrival of the Egyptians in Yemen in 1962. By 1966 it was clear to all that the conflict in the south would be a fight over who would control the successor regime. Cairo was determined that its allies must be the victors.Other powers had reasons for wanting to stay. Orkaby provides some new information and analysis to show that the Soviet Union had reservations about the capacity of al-Sallal to rule and were actively studying five potential successors. Moscow invested in small-scale development operations, preparing itself for the time when Egypt would eventually withdraw from the north and the British from the south. Washington saw Yemen as a “blank slate where their most ambitious visions for modern development could be implemented.” Both the Americans and the Soviets provided assistance to the Egyptian economy, among other reasons, in order to enable Egypt to stay in Yemen and to discourage it from attacking Israel.Chapter 7 is devoted to the Anglo-Egyptian rivalry and to the Suez Group, a group of British politicians who were determined to keep Egyptian troops so busy defending themselves that they would not be able to pose a risk to the British in South Arabia. Other scholars—notably Clive Jones—have told the story about how sixty-four British and twenty-four French mercenaries caused great damage to the Egyptians, with the help of Saudi money and a clandestine air bridge provided by Israel.5The final chapter in the main narrative goes over some familiar ground, analyzing how Egypt's involvement in Yemen contributed to its defeat in the June War of 1967. What is new is the perspective it offers on what Israel learned from its involvement with the Suez Group and would later incorporate into its battle plan and tactics. For Yemen, the main impact of the war was the final withdrawal of Egyptian troops (the last of the Egyptians left, symbolically, after the final departure of the British from Aden).The war among the Yemenis continued even after Egypt and Saudi Arabia agreed to cease their involvement in August 1967. Leaders of the Third Force were released to return to political life in Yemen, and al-Sallal was soon exiled to Baghdad. Royalist forces were able to impose a seventy-day siege on the city. Shortly after it ended, the protagonists negotiated a deal to set up a coalition government that excluded the Imam and his family, which eventually led to a conference of national reconciliation.Orkaby has a particular research interest in chemical warfare, and he devotes an entire chapter to Egypt's use of chemical weapons in Yemen. The topic has been ignored by the governments of Yemen and Egypt, and it does not feature in memoir accounts of the war. Orkaby argues that Egypt and its international friends at the time kept it out of the media and the UN, even though the British, for one, made a vain effort to bring it to international attention.This highly readable study makes use of previously unavailable sources to add depth and detail to our knowledge of Yemen in the 1960s. There are some weaknesses in the work, for example, the discussion of the British in the south. But the epilogue, though in need of updating, is a powerful and relevant reminder—not least to the current UN Peace Envoy—that outsiders who interfere in Yemen usually interfere to their own detriment. It is also a reminder that, in the final analysis, peace—if not war—is made by Yemenis. Orkaby reminds us that “foreign intervention has served to exacerbate local issues and cloud the true underlying national tensions” that seemed to necessitate intervention in the first place. This book is thus essential reading not only for those who are interested in the history of the Yemeni civil war of the 1960s but for those who are interested in the current Yemeni conflict as well.