BusinessEconomicsFinanceFinancial EconomicsFinancial MarketsFinancial Risk ManagementCredit MarketsCredit RiskFinancial CrisesFinancial RiskMoral HazardSystemic RiskBalance Sheet DistortionEquilibriumEx Ante Risk AssessmentMoral Hazard AnalysisMoral Hazard BehaviorSystemic Crisis ManagementSystemic Risk Effects
We develop a quantitative equilibrium model of financial crises to assess the interaction between ex post interventions in credit markets and the buildup of risk ex ante. During a systemic crisis, bailouts relax balance sheet constraints and mitigate the severity of the recession. Ex ante, the anticipation of such bailouts leads to an increase in risk-taking, making the economy more vulnerable to a financial crisis. We find that moral hazard effects are limited if bailouts are systemic and broad-based. If bailouts are idiosyncratic and targeted, however, this makes the economy significantly more exposed to financial crises. (JEL E23, E32, E44, E63, G01, G21, G28)
30
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny · The Journal of Finance · 1997 · 16.2K citations · Full text
American Economic Review · 2012 · 13.8K citations
Nobuhiro Kiyotaki, John Moore · Journal of Political Economy · 1997 · 4.7K citations
A model of unconventional monetary policy
Mark Gertler, Péter Karádi · Journal of Monetary Economics · 2010 · 2.4K citations