Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.

TLDR

Evidence indicates that people often lack direct introspective access to higher‑order cognitive processes, as they may be unaware of influential stimuli, the responses they produce, or the causal link between them. The study proposes that reports of cognitive processes are not based on true introspection but on other factors. The authors argue that such reports rely on a priori implicit causal theories that judge how plausibly a stimulus causes a response. The findings show that accurate reports are possible when salient, plausible stimuli influence responses, but not when stimuli are non‑salient or implausible causes.

Abstract

Evidence is reviewed which suggests that there may be little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes. Subjects are sometimes (a) unaware of the existence of a stimulus that importantly influenced a response, (b) unaware of the existence of the response, and (c) unaware that the stimulus has affected the response. It is proposed that when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, that is, on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do so on the basis of any true introspection. Instead, their reports are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or judgments about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response. This suggests that though people may not be able to observe directly their cognitive processes, they will sometimes be able to report accurately about them. Accurate reports will occur when influential stimuli are salient and are plausible causes of the responses they produce, and will not occur when stimuli are not salient or are not plausible causes.