Journal of Computer Security · 2018 · 18 citations · 30 references
ComputingComputer EngineeringComputer ScienceCompilersFormal MethodsProgramming LanguagesAbstract InterpretationControl-flow AnalysisData-flow AnalysisDeductive VerificationStatic AnalysisStatic Code AnalysisAlias StructureConstant-time ImplementationConstant-time ProgrammingConstant-time VerificationLeakageRuntime Taint AnalysisStatic Control-flow AnalysisTiming Leak Verification
Constant-time programming is an established discipline to secure programs against timing attackers. Several real-world secure C libraries such as NaCl, mbedTLS, or Open Quantum Safe, follow this discipline. We propose an advanced static analysis, based on state-of-the-art techniques from abstract interpretation, to report time leakage during programming. To that purpose, we analyze source C programs and use full context-sensitive and arithmetic-aware alias analyses to track the tainted flows. We give semantic evidence of the correctness of our approach on a core language. We also present a prototype implementation for C programs that is based on the CompCert compiler toolchain and its companion Verasco static analyzer. We present verification results on various real-world constant-time programs and report on a successful verification of a challenging SHA-256 implementation that was out of scope of previous tool-assisted approaches.
30
Patrick Cousot, Radhia Cousot · 1977 · 6.2K citations
A lattice model of secure information flow
Dorothy E. Denning · Communications of the ACM · 1976 · 1.9K citations · Full text
Formal verification of a realistic compiler
Xavier Leroy · Communications of the ACM · 2009 · 1.1K citations
Andrew C. Myers · 1999 · 1K citations · Full text