Publication | Closed Access
A Rationale for Debt Maturity Structure and Call Provisions in the Agency Theoretic Framework
99
Citations
0
References
1980
Year
Maturity StructureDebt ManagementCall ProvisionsManagementExternal DebtDebt Maturity StructureSovereign DebtAccountingLoansFinancial InstrumentsCorporate GovernanceTechnical DebtComplex Financial InstrumentsFinanceCall ProvisionAgency Theoretic FrameworkBusinessInternational DebtFinancial StructureCapital StructureBankruptcy
Complex financial instruments, such as call provisions and maturity structures, arise because markets cannot fully and cheaply address agency problems. The study introduces agency costs of debt to explain the existence of complex financial instruments. The paper shows that call provisions and maturity structures resolve agency problems related to informational asymmetry, managerial risk incentives, and foregone growth opportunities, and that both features serve identical purposes.
The agency costs of debt are introduced in this paper to explain the existence of complex financial instruments. Two areas of complexities are discussed in detail: the call provision and the maturity structure of debt. Their existence is rationalized as a means of resolving agency problems associated with informational asymmetry, managerial (stockholder) risk incentives, and foregone growth opportunities. It is also demonstrated that both features of corporate debt serve identical purposes in solving agency problems. Complex financial instruments are required because markets fail to provide complete and costless solutions to the agency problems discussed in the paper.