The Accounting Review · 2022 · 56 citations · 63 references
LawCorporate GovernanceFinanceCorporate FinanceCorporate ReportingTax AvoidanceComparative Corporate GovernanceComparative Corporate TaxationCorporate Income TaxCorporate TransparencyCross-border Tax AvoidanceTax ReportingCorporate Governance DecisionsCorporate Tax GovernanceCross-listed Firms GovernanceData AvailabilityDifference-in-differencesShareholder Protection MechanismsTax Avoidance Incidence
ABSTRACT Using a sample of firms from 51 countries and a difference-in-differences approach that exploits corporate governance shocks induced by cross-listing in the U.S., we find that firms tend to engage in less tax avoidance after cross-listing. This effect is more pronounced for firms that experience significant improvements in corporate governance, and for firms from countries with weaker shareholder protection and disclosure requirements. Taken together, the results indicate that cross-listing in the U.S. helps align the interests of managers and shareholders and reduces managerial diversion. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from sources indicated in the text. JEL Classifications: G21; G18; G32; G34; G35.
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