Cyber Physical Systems Security for Maritime Assets

Iosif Progoulakis, Paul Rohmeyer

Journal of Marine Science and Engineering · 2021 · 66 citations · 5 references

DOIFull text

Open access

Concepts

TL;DR

Maritime assets rely on integrated IT, OT, and human factors, forming cyber‑physical systems with diverse, evolving communication paths that face growing cyber‑security threats. The paper describes known cyber‑security threats and breach scenarios to highlight the evolution of maritime cyber‑physical systems and their emerging vulnerabilities. The authors recommend applying industry risk‑assessment tools such as API STD 780 SRA and Bow‑Tie analysis, together with NIST CSF and MITRE ATT&CK controls, to evaluate and mitigate cyber and physical vulnerabilities in maritime IT and OT infrastructure. Integrating cyber and physical security functions and coordinating onshore‑ and offshore‑based infrastructure improves stakeholder communication, operational resilience, and cyber‑security awareness for maritime assets.

Abstract

The integration of IT, OT, and human factor elements in maritime assets is critical for their efficient and safe operation and performance. This integration defines cyber physical systems and involves a number of IT and OT components, systems, and functions that involve multiple and diverse communication paths that are technologically and operationally evolving along with credible cyber security threats. These cyber security threats and risks as well as a number of known security breach scenarios are described in this paper to highlight the evolution of cyber physical systems in the maritime domain and their emerging cyber vulnerabilities. Current industry and governmental standards and directives related to cyber security in the maritime domain attempt to enforce the regulatory compliance and reinforce asset cyber security integrity for optimum and safe performance with limited focus, however, in the existing OT infrastructure and systems. The use of outside-of-the-maritime industry security risk assessment tools and processes, such the API STD 780 Security Risk Assessment (SRA) and the Bow Tie Analysis methodologies, can assist the asset owner to assess its IT and OT infrastructure for cyber and physical security vulnerabilities and allocate proper mitigation measures assuming their similarities to ICS infrastructure. The application of cyber security controls deriving from the adaptation of the NIST CSF and the MITRE ATT&CK Threat Model can further increase the cyber security integrity of maritime assets, assuming they are periodically evaluated for their effectiveness and applicability. Finally, the improvement in communication among stakeholders, the increase in operational and technical cyber and physical security resiliency, and the increase in operational cyber security awareness would be further increased for maritime assets by the convergence of the distinct physical and cyber security functions as well as onshore- and offshore-based cyber infrastructure of maritime companies and asset owners.

References

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