Teleology and Evil in 'Laws' 10

Abstract

THE TENTH BOOK OF THE LAWS, which contains Plato's last word on cosmology and theology, has often been considered as presenting Plato's views in a more exoteric way in contrast with the more esoteric style of the Timaeus. there are good reasons think this view is correct. Whereas the Timaeus stresses to find the maker and father of this All is difficult, and, having found it, it is impossible communicate it the crowd (28c),(1) Plato is in Laws 10 intending establish a (prooimion, 887a-b) or rational foundation for his laws against impiety, which are supposed be known by all. in this proemium Plato tries argue for three propositions: (1) the gods exist (887c--899d); (2) they take care of human affairs (899d-905d); (3) they cannot be bribed by sacrifices or prayers (905d-907b).(2) The underlying assumption is learning these facts about the gods will also help prevent impiety which, like any kind of vice, is often due ignorance (885b). If this is so, what most surprises us is Plato does not however have qualms about introducing in this apologetic discourse a reference an soul as acts alternative candidate a good soul ruling over the universe (896e). This has provoked the most varied reactions, from ancient Platonistss attributing Plato a dualism would appear manichean our eyes, recent interpreters who have denied Plato is at all concerned with the World-Soul in the Laws. It has also been very much debated whether the general account of Laws 10 is consistent with the Timaeus. This requires us examine the status of soul and its connection with in Laws 10 against the background of Platb's cosmological account in earlier dialogues. I shall try show Laws 10 is be taken as an emphatic assertion of cosmic teleology--based on the supremacy of soul--that follows the spirit of the earlier dialogues and involves an explicit rejection of any kind of World-Soul ruling over the whole cosmos. This rejection, however, does not do away with the existence of an evil kind of soul, nor does it do away with the problem of in general, about which Plato seems be worried probably more than ever, though at the same time he wishes more than ever be convincing about the existence of teleology. This, as we shall see, gives the Laws a fluctuating tone between optimism and pessimism, which could nevertheless be resolved as pessimism about individual human affairs but optimism about the victory of goodness in the whole will subsume any partial evil. I The priority of soul over body. Why does Plato need prove god exists? It is obvious this need arises when god's existence is no longer evident or a matter of consensus, as it used be (885e-886a), but has now been controverted by modern theories. It will no longer be sufficent point the sun, moon, stars and earth, as instances of divinity, because many people would say that these things are simply earth and stone and bulks of inanimate things (886d-e, cf. 12.967c). These matelialists claim the priority of body over soul (891c) and posit nature (phusis), (tuche), or by necessity (tuche ex anankes) (889c) as the main cause of everything: the random motion, collision, and admixture of opposite properties of water, earth, fire, and air (like hot-cold, wet-dry, soft-hard) gave rise the heavenly bodies and the universe in general (889b-c). And all this, as they assert, not by reason (nous), god (theos) or art (techne) but . . . by nature and chance (889c). It is these materialists, then, who provide the scientific support for atheism. Plato purports attack them by conversely establishing the priority of soul over body. To phusis understood as and necessity, Plato opposes his own principles, namely god and design (techne) and intellect (nous) as things akin soul (889b-c, cf 892a-c). …