Russian Dilemmas in a Multipolar World

Fyodor Lukyanov

Journal of international affairs · 2010 · 18 citations · 0 references

Concepts

Abstract

When Vladimir Putin described breakup of Soviet Union several years ago as the greatest geopolitical of 20th century, his words triggered a strong reaction in West and among Russia's neighbors. They sensed that Russian president's words held not only nostalgia for now-vanished great power but also hidden imperial ambitions. Indeed, Russia's political class of late 20th and early 21st century is overcoming its post-imperial syndrome with difficulty. This phenomenon is not unique--many European empires faced same problem in 20th century. In Russia's case, situation is compounded by fact that country's disintegration meant loss of territories that had never been viewed as colonies but had been seen as a natural part of country's historical and cultural core. For first time in Russian people have become a divided nation. After Soviet Union ceased to exist, 25 million ethnic Russians found themselves living outside Russian Federation, which could not but have an impact on policies of Moscow and other newly independent states. (1) At same time, Putin's words also carried a deeper meaning that few people noticed. For centuries, Russian Empire, and later Soviet Union, served as a supporting frame that structured expansive Eurasian space from eastern Europe to Far East and from Arctic Circle to central Asian deserts. Yet it was development of Russian imperial statehood, to which many peoples of West and East contributed, that largely shaped situation on vast territory. Throughout this territory sometimes found itself on periphery and sometimes at center of world politics. Its collapse was a momentous event in terms of its impact on structural stability of international system, especially in second half of 20th century when Soviet Union was not just an influential regional power, but one of two pillars on which entire world order was based. Therefore, its collapse was not just a matter of national self-perception, but also a radical change in foundation of world order. One can debate whether Soviet Union's breakup was really greatest geopolitical catastrophe of last century--after all, First and Second World Wars were cataclysms for mankind. However, absolute consequences of collapse of Eurasian empire are still unknown. They will manifest themselves only when a new status quo is established. Until a new balance of power takes shape among Russia and other major global powers, it will remain unclear who has gained and who has lost as a result of these events. The most striking aspect of Soviet Union's collapse is sensation in Russia that current state is but temporary and lacks a clear goal to achieve stability and prosperity. The experience of last twenty years has made Russia a principled opponent of ideology of liberal end of history, which had a great influence on Western political views in last decade of 20th century. The scenario of end of history, a la Fukuyama, assigned role of loser to Moscow and sociopolitical model that it embodied. However, Russia did not consider itself defeated because it was Moscow that had made a decisive contribution to dismantling of world communist system through work of Mikhail Gorbachev and, later, Boris Yeltsin. And when Moscow failed to fit into Washington-dominated world order in 1990s, there emerged in Russia a desire to restore its former position on world stage. This desire implied need to go further--beyond end of history, to its return. But desire to restore its lost status is not only reason for Russia's opposition to politics of end of history. It is interesting how resolutely post-Soviet Russia has broken away from Marxist views on historical processes. …