Aristotle's Defense of the Theoretical Life: Comments on Politics 7

David Roochnik

˜The œreview of metaphysics · 2008 · 24 citations · 0 references

Concepts

Abstract

ARISTOTLE OPENS POLITICS 7, his discussion of form of government (politeias aristes), which he later calls the city according to prayer (kat'euchen), by informing his audience of his plan of attack. (1) Anyone who undertakes an inquiry into ideal city must, he says, first determine what most choice-worthy is. (2) After all, is fitting for those who are best governed to act in best way. (3) To commence discussion of nature of this best life he refers to what he calls the exoteric discourses, which, whatever exactly they were, seem to have expressed basic ethical principles. (4) Concerning one distinction, no one would disagree. There are three divisions [to be made within best life]: external [goods], those of body, and those of soul. All of these must belong to those who are to be among blessedly happy (makariois). (5) For no one would say that blessed man has no share of courage or moderation or of justice or practical wisdom, but is afraid of flies buzzing around, can resist nothing when he desires food or drink, destroys his dearest friends for a pittance, and is as foolish and prone to error when it comes to intellectual matters as a child or a madman. With these assertions everyone would agree. (6) Aristotle is confident that no one would disagree that best life requires possession of sufficient external goods (like money), a healthy body, and most important of all, good which belongs to soul; namely, (arete). He not use this last word in passage above, but his mention of courage, moderation, and so on, as well as fact that he uses it shortly thereafter clearly indicate that is what he has in (7) Even if it is granted that best life requires virtue, it is not clear in what sort of virtue such a life consists. Politics 7.2 narrows possibilities to two: Which is more choiceworthy life, that of engaging in political activity and sharing in life of city, or is it rather life of stranger (ho xenikos) whose ties to political community have been dissolved? (8) Among those who agree that best life is most choiceworthy there is dispute whether political and practical life is choiceworthy, or whether life whose ties to all external matters have been dissolved--namely, theoretical life, which some people say is only life for a philosopher--is more choiceworthy. For it is nearly case that most honor-loving of men, both of past and of present, seem to choose these two lives when it comes to virtue. The two I mean are political and (9) From a long tradition, Aristotle inherits view that there are two genuinely excellent forms of life: theoretical-philosophical and practical-political. (10) In Nicomachean Ethics 10.7-8 he argues unambiguously on behalf of former. Most commentators think he is less straightforward here in Politics 7.1. For example, Kraut says that Aristotle does not decisively draw a conclusion about which is better. (11) Reeve describes him as cagey, dialectically balancing claims on political life against philosophical, but not giving decisive precedence to either. (12) Solmsen puts point strongly by saying that we have to accept oscillations of argument and ambiguity of his conclusion; they are indicative of a deeper conflict between diverging tendencies and inclinations in his mind. (13) Miller concurs: Aristotle's discussion is somewhat inconclusive because he not explicitly answer question he has posed as to whether best life is political and or philosophical. (14) Miller's assertion is based on his reading of following passage. Some consider that despotic rule over one's neighbors involves greatest injustice, while political rule, even if it not involve injustice, nonetheless is an impediment to one's own well-being. …