ACM Transactions on Information and System Security · 2009 · 57 citations · 57 references
ComputingComputer EngineeringComputer ScienceApplication SecurityComputer SecuritySecure Software DevelopmentAccess ControlControl-flow AnalysisMicroarchitectural SecurityOperating System SecuritySecurity ControlsSystem SecurityControl Flow Integrity AnalysisControl Flow ObfuscationControl-flow IntegrityProtected Memory RegionsSafety Property VerificationSecurity EnforcementSecurity Policies Modeling
Software attacks often exploit machine‑code execution, but control‑flow integrity (CFI) can prevent arbitrary control by enforcing a basic safety property that is formally provable, practical, and compatible with existing systems. CFI also enables enforcement of additional security policies, as shown by efficient implementations of a protected shadow call stack and memory‑region access control.
Current software attacks often build on exploits that subvert machine-code execution. The enforcement of a basic safety property, control-flow integrity (CFI), can prevent such attacks from arbitrarily controlling program behavior. CFI enforcement is simple and its guarantees can be established formally, even with respect to powerful adversaries. Moreover, CFI enforcement is practical: It is compatible with existing software and can be done efficiently using software rewriting in commodity systems. Finally, CFI provides a useful foundation for enforcing further security policies, as we demonstrate with efficient software implementations of a protected shadow call stack and of access control for memory regions.
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