The multi-player evolutionary game analysis for the protective development of ecotourism

Abstract

This study constructs a multi-player evolutionary game of local governments, tourism enterprises, and residents to analyze the stability strategies of game players in ecotourism protective development. The results show that the evolutionary game system of ecotourism conservation development can form four kinds of stable strategies under different conditions. The marginal influence of restrictive factors on the players’ strategic choice is more significant than that of incentive factors. Government penalties and incentives promote tourism enterprises to choose protective development strategies, and residents to choose supervision strategies. When higher protective development rewards exceed the government’s support capacity, the probability of local governments choosing active supervision strategies will decrease. Tourism enterprises will also reduce the probability of choosing protective development strategies due to the lack of effective supervision. The research results can help decision-makers to formulate ecotourism protection and development policies, and promote the sustainable development of ecotourism.