Event-Triggered Control for Networked Systems Under Denial of Service Attacks and Applications

TLDR

Denial‑of‑service attacks in networked control systems compromise communication security and can degrade system stability. The study investigates resilient controller design and synthesis for networked control systems under DoS attacks using an adaptive event‑triggered strategy to mitigate threats and reduce communication load. An observer‑based controller is developed, and a joint design method computes controller and observer gains along with an event‑triggered weight matrix to stabilize the system despite stochastic attacks. Simulations on four‑tank, Internet‑based three‑tank, and Internet‑based test rig systems demonstrate the proposed approach effectively counteracts DoS attacks.

Abstract

In this paper, the resilient controller design and synthesis issues of networked control systems under denial-of-service (DoS) attacks are investigated via an adaptive event-triggered strategy. In a networked control system, DoS attacks have serious impacts on the security of communication, possibly causing degraded stability performance of the system. To remove threats from DoS attacks, an adaptive event-triggered communication mechanism is proposed, which also provides benefits in reducing the consumption of communication resources and relieving the pressure on network bandwidth. Since the system state information is usually not fully known, an observer-based controller is developed to stabilize the system and maintain a desired performance index despite the occurrence of stochastic attacks. Furthermore, a joint design method is proposed to obtain the controller gain, observer gain and event-triggered weight matrix. Finally, practical examples based on a four-tank system, an Internet-based three-tank system and an Internet-based test rig system are presented to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed techniques to respond and eliminate the impact of DoS attacks.