Markov Probability Fingerprints: A Method for Identifying Encrypted Video Traffic

Abstract

Detecting illegal video plays an important role in preventing and countering crime in daily life. It is effective for supervisors to monitor the network by analyzing traffic from devices. In this way, illegal video can be detected when it is played on the network. Most Internet traffic is encrypted, which brings difficulties to traffic analysis. However, many researches suggest that even if the video traffic is encrypted, the segmentation prescribed by Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP (DASH) causes content-dependent fragments, which can be used to identify the encrypted video traffic without decryption. This paper presents Markov probability fingerprint for video, and then designs an algorithm for encrypted video streaming title identification. We demonstrate that an external attacker can identify the video title by analyzing the fragment sequence of encrypted video traffic. Based on the m-order Markov chain, we use the transition tensor of the fragment sequence generated by the video traffic as the video fingerprint, and prove its effectiveness. Then we explore approaches that can further improve the performance of methods in terms of discrimination accuracy. We make promising observations that the higher-order Markov chain, larger training set, and more detailed binning of fragments contribute to encrypted video traffic discrimination. We run a thorough set of experiments that illustrate that our method can achieve an outstanding accuracy rate up to 97.5%, which is superior to previous work.