Mind · 2013 · 15 citations · 0 references
HumanitiesPhilosophyPsychologyEpistemologyPhilosophy Of MindSelfConsciousnessMental ImageryPhilosophy Of PerceptionStream Of ConsciousnessTheories Of KnowledgeTheory Of MindCognitive Theory Of MindPhilosophical InterpretationPropositional ContentPropositional ReasoningSelf-perception TheorySelf-understanding In InterpretationSense Of SelfWittgensteinian Fideism
Peter Carruthers began his career studying Wittgenstein, writing his first two books on the Tractatus. It is hard to imagine a book more distant in style and emphasis from the Wittgensteinian legacy than The Opacity of Mind, but the ghost of the Philosophical Investigations is floating in the vicinity of Carruthers’s most recent book. Carruthers offers a robust antidote to dominant views about self-knowledge. In particular, Carruthers bracingly takes aim at any theory of self-knowledge on which we have transparent introspective access even to our current propositional attitudes and affective states. Instead, he claims, our access to our own minds is sensory and interpretive. We tell a story about our beliefs, desires, and emotions ultimately derived from mental images, fragments of inner speech, and other denizens of the stream of consciousness (including outwardly-directed sensory experience). The raw materials are different for the stories we tell about the mental states of others, but in both cases we have an exercise of interpretation based on sensory data.