American Economic Journal Microeconomics · 2021 · 112 citations · 48 references
Social SciencesPsychologySocial PsychologyCommunication TheoryGame TheoryStrategic CommunicationAsymmetric InformationDisclosureDisclosure TheoryInformation AsymmetryInformation EconomicsInformation RevelationDisclosure GamesExperimental SubjectInformation Disclosure DecisionsInformation Revelation StrategyPrivate Information DisclosurePrivate Information RevelationStrategic Information DisclosureStrategic Information Revelation
This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it. In a simple sender-receiver game, we find that senders disclose favorable information, but withhold unfavorable information. The degree to which senders withhold information is strongly related to their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and their stated beliefs are accurate on average. Receiver actions are also strongly related to their stated beliefs, but their actions and beliefs suggest that many are insufficiently skeptical about nondisclosed information in the absence of repeated feedback. (JEL C70, D82, D83)
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A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Ernst Fehr, Klaus M. Schmidt · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1999 · 11.1K citations · Full text
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
Urs Fischbacher · Experimental Economics · 2007 · 9.9K citations · Full text
Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects
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Business, Economics, Psychology +17
Strategic Information Transmission
Vincent P. Crawford, Joel Sobel · Econometrica · 1982 · 4.4K citations