BRQ Business Research Quarterly · 2021 · 28 citations · 47 references
ManagementAccountancyCorporate GovernanceAgency TheoryCorporate FinanceFinancial AccountingBoard IndependenceBoard OversightEarnings ManagementAccrual Earnings ManagementCorporate Co-determinationSelection
This study contributes to the emerging literature on board co-option by examining how and to what extent co-opted directors influence managers’ attitudes about earnings management. We find robust evidence that co-option mitigates both real activities and accrual-based earnings management. Our findings support the view that higher co-option reduces managerial short-termism because it enhances managers’ job security as co-opted directors are known to be less likely to remove managers from office. Our results are robust to different measures of both co-option and earnings management, and they continue to hold after accounting for endogeneity and selection concerns. Finally, we provide additional evidence showing that a higher degree of co-option lowers the likelihood of the chief executive officer (CEO) being forcefully removed from the office for managing earnings in the previous year. JEL CLASSIFICATION G30; G34; G39
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The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities
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Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
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Separation of Ownership and Control
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