Economica · 2004 · 42 citations · 13 references
Social SciencesCriminal LawCriminologyCrimePolicingTeamworkCrime PreventionCriminal EnforcementCriminal JusticeCooperation IncentivesCrime Reporting BehaviorDeterrencePrisoner’s DilemmaSelf-reporting IncentivesSelf-reporting Regimes
We extend the analysis of self‐reporting schemes to criminal teams. When the violators behave non‐cooperatively, maximum deterrence can be reached at virtually no cost by designing a prisoners' dilemma. One drawback of such a scheme is that it might induce cooperative behaviour in the self‐reporting stage. If the cooperation rate is increasing the benefits from cooperation, it is optimal to impose less than the maximum fine if both individuals self‐report. The same result occurs for imperfect self‐reporting technologies where the conviction of one agent does not necessarily lead to a conviction of his accomplice.
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