American Political Science Review · 2001 · 370 citations · 6 references
Social SciencesPolitical ScienceElectoral PoliticsLegislative PoliticsLegislative StudiesLegislative Decision-makingLegislative ElectionsParty CompetitionParty DisciplineParty PoliticsVoting BehaviorIdeal Point EstimationIdeal Point ModelingLegislative Party BehaviorLegislative Party DisciplineLegislative Voting BehaviorParty ChoiceParty Line VotingRoll Call Bargaining
We analyze party discipline in the House of Representatives between 1947 and 1998. The effects of party pressures can be represented in a spatial model by allowing each party to have its own cutting line on roll call votes. Adding a second cutting line makes, at best, a marginal improvement over the standard single-line model. Analysis of legislators who switch parties shows, however, that party discipline is manifest in the location of the legislator's ideal point. In contrast to our approach, we find that the Snyder-Groseclose method of estimating the influence of party discipline is biased toward exaggerating party effects.
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Patterns of Congressional Voting
Keith T. Poole, Howard L. Rosenthal · American Journal of Political Science · 1991 · 811 citations
Nonparametric Unfolding of Binary Choice Data
Keith T. Poole · Political Analysis · 2000 · 222 citations · Full text