Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · 2014 · 261 citations · 40 references
ManagementCorporate GovernanceCorporate LawCorporate FinanceInnovationMergersComparative Corporate GovernanceMerger RegulationOrganizational InnovationOwnership StructureTakeover DefensesTakeover RegulationAnti-takeover DefensesAntitakeover DefenseControlling Shareholder ExpropriationCorporate Control MechanismsCorporate Control StructuresCorporate Control SystemsTakeover StrategyTakeover Threat
Abstract We develop a theory to show how external and internal corporate governance mechanisms affect innovation. We predict a U-shaped relation between innovation and external takeover pressure, which arises from the interaction between expected takeover premia and private benefits of control. Using ex ante and ex post innovation measures, we find strong empirical support for the predicted relation. We exploit the variation in takeover pressure created by the passage of antitakeover laws across different states. Innovation is fostered either by an unhindered market for corporate control or by antitakeover laws that are severe enough to effectively deter takeovers.
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Interaction terms in logit and probit models
Chunrong Ai, Edward C. Norton · Economics Letters · 2003 · 5.8K citations