Money market pressure and the determinants of baning crises

Juergen von Hagen, Tai‐kuang Ho

Econstor (Econstor) · 2004 · 24 citations · 0 references

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Abstract

Identifying banking crises is the first step in the research on determinants of banking crises. The
\nprevailing practice is to employ market events to identify a banking crisis. Researchers justify the usage of this
\nmethod on the grounds that either direct and reliable indicators of banks’ assets quality are not available, or that
\nwithdrawals of bank deposits are no longer a part of financial crises in a modern financial system with deposits
\ninsurance. Meanwhile, most researchers also admit that there are inherent inconsistency and arbitrariness
\nassociated with the events method.
\nThis paper develops an index of money market pressure to identify banking crises. We define banking
\ncrises as periods in which there is excessive demand for liquidity in the money market. We begin with the
\ntheoretical foundation of this new method and show that it is desirable, and also possible, to depend on a more
\nobjective index of money market pressure rather than market events to identify banking crises. This approach
\nallows one to employ high frequency data in regression, and avoid the ambiguity problem in interpreting the
\ndirection of causality that most banking literature suffers. Comparing the crises dates with existing research
\nindicates that the new method is able to identify banking crises more accurately than the events method. The
\ntwo components of the index, changes in central bank funds to bank deposits ratio and changes in short-term
\nreal interest rate, are equally important in the identification of banking crises. Bank deposits, combined with
\ncentral bank funds, provide valuable information on banking distress.
\nWith the newly defined crisis episodes, we examine the determinants of banking crises using data
\ncomplied from 47 countries. We estimate conditional logit models that include macroeconomic, financial, and
\ninstitutional variables in the explanatory variables. The results display similarities to and differences with
\nexisting research. We find that slowdown of real GDP, lower real interest rates, extremely high inflation, large
\nfiscal deficits, and over-valued exchange rates tend to precede banking crises. The effects of monetary base
\ngrowth on the probability of banking crises are negligible.