Analyst Coverage and Financing Decisions

TLDR

The study examines how analyst coverage influences firms’ security issuance decisions. Firms with less analyst coverage are less likely to issue equity, issue it less frequently but in larger amounts, rely more on favorable market conditions, and have debt ratios more sensitive to market‑to‑book ratios, supporting market‑timing and adverse‑selection explanations.

Abstract

ABSTRACT We provide evidence that analyst coverage affects security issuance. First, firms covered by fewer analysts are less likely to issue equity as opposed to debt. They issue equity less frequently, but when they do so, it is in larger amounts. Moreover, these firms depend more on favorable market conditions for their equity issuance decisions. Finally, debt ratios of less covered firms are more affected by Baker and Wurgler's (2002) “external finance‐weighted” average market‐to‐book ratio. These results are consistent with market timing behavior associated with information asymmetry, as well as behavior implied by dynamic adverse selection models of equity issuance.