The Journal of Economic Perspectives · 2004 · 669 citations · 60 references
Social SciencesPolitical SciencePublic PolicyComparative PoliticsComparative Public PolicyDemocratizationDemocracyElectionsElectoral BehaviorElectoral CompetitionPolitical CompetitionVoting BehaviorComparative Voting BehaviorDemocratic ElectionsDemocratic GovernmentEfficiencyPolitical Competition ModelsPolitical Power DistributionPublic Policy Choice
Voting theory posits that democratic voting mutates policy preference intensity, equalizes political power, and that voting form matters, while alternative models emphasize competition over voting structure. The study tests whether democracy influences redistributive, leadership‑favoring, or efficiency‑enhancing policies. The authors estimate democracy’s effect on the public sector by comparing 142 countries from 1960 to 1990. No differences were found in redistributive, leadership‑favoring, or efficiency policies, but democracy correlates with policies that limit competition for public office.
Estimates of democracy's effect on the public sector are obtained from comparisons of 142 countries over the years 1960–90. Based on three tenets of voting theory – that voting mutes policy preference intensity, political power is equally distributed in democracies, and the form of voting processes is important—we expect democracy to affect policies that redistribute, or economically favor the political leadership, or enhance efficiency. We do not find such differences. Instead democracy is correlated with policies that limit competition for public office. Alternative modeling approaches emphasize the degree of competition, and deemphasize the form or even existence of voting processes.
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