Brooklyn journal of international law · 2010 · 14 citations · 0 references
Social SciencesEconomicsRegulatory PolicyFinancial EconomicsFinancial RegulationPublic EconomicsBanking RegulationFinancial CrisesFinancial DistressFinancial RiskMacroprudential RegulationMarket FailureEconomic IncentivesImplicit SubsidiesToo Big To Fail GovernanceToo-big-to-fail EffectsToo-big-to-fail ProblemToo-big-to-fail RegulationToo-big-to-fail ResolutionToo-big-to-fail Risk
INTRODUCTION he ongoing financial crisis—widely viewed as the worst since the Great Depression—has inflicted tremendous damage on financial markets and economies around the world. The crisis has revealed fundamental weaknesses in the financial regulatory systems of the United States (“U.S.”), the United Kingdom (“U.K.”), and other European nations, making regulatory reforms an urgent priority. Publicly-funded bailouts of “too big to fail” (“TBTF”) financial institutions have provided indisputable proof that (i) TBTF institutions benefit from large explicit and implicit public subsidies, and (ii) those subsidies distort economic incentives and encourage excessive risk-taking by large, complex financial institutions (“LCFIs”). Accordingly, the primary objective of regulatory reforms must be to eliminate (or at least greatly reduce) TBTF subsidies and to force LCFIs to internalize the risks and costs of their activities. Parts I and II of this article survey the consequences and causes of the current financial crisis. As described in Part I, the financial crisis has