Production of Information, Information Asymmetry, and the Bid-Ask Spread: EmpiricalEvidence from Analysts’ Forecasts

Abstract

In this paper we suggest that market makers deduce the extent of the adverse selection problem associated with a stock (and set up the bid-ask spread accordingly) by observing how many financial analysts are following that stock. Market makers do this based on the belief that more financial analysts would follow a stock with a greater extent of information asymmetry since the value of private information increases with informational asymmetry. Similarly, financial analysts deduce the profit potential of a stock from the size of the spread set up by market makers (based on the expectation that market makers would set up a greater spread for the stock with a greater information asymmetry). This structural view of the process determining the bid-ask spread and analyst following is empirically tested using a simultaneous equations regression analysis. The empirical results are generally consistent with this view. Hence, our study supports the notion that the decisions of two major players in the financial markets (i.e.. market makers and financial analysts) are made interactively.