Publication | Closed Access
Whistle-Blowing: Target Firm Characteristics and Economic Consequences
308
Citations
43
References
2010
Year
LawAuditingSecurities LawCorporate Risk ManagementTarget Firm CharacteristicsAudit QualityMergers And AcquisitionsControl GroupCorporate GovernanceWhistleblowingFinanceEmployee AllegationsMarket ManipulationAccounting PolicyBusinessBusiness StrategyAudit RegulationFinancial StatementCorporate Finance
The study documents systematic evidence on the characteristics and economic consequences of firms facing employee whistle‑blowing allegations. The authors compare whistle‑blowing firms to a control group, identifying firm‑specific factors that trigger employee exposure of alleged financial misdeeds. Whistle‑blowing firms experience a 2.8 % negative five‑day stock‑price reaction (−7.3 % for earnings‑management claims), increased earnings restatements, lawsuits, and poorer future performance, yet they are more likely to improve governance, indicating whistle‑blowing is a valuable tool for uncovering agency problems.
ABSTRACT: We document the first systematic evidence on the characteristics and economic consequences of firms subject to employee allegations of corporate financial misdeeds. First, compared to a control group that avoided public whistle-blowing allegations, firms subject to whistle-blowing allegations were characterized by unique firm-specific factors that led employees to expose alleged financial misdeeds. Second, on average, whistle-blowing announcements were associated with a negative 2.8 percent market-adjusted five-day stock price reaction; this reaction was especially negative for allegations involving earnings management (−7.3 percent). Third, compared to a control group that exhibits similar characteristics, firms subject to whistle-blowing allegations were associated with further negative consequences including earnings restatements, shareholder lawsuits, and negative future operating and stock return performance. Finally, whistle-blowing targets exposed by the press were more likely to make subsequent improvements in corporate governance. Our results suggest whistle-blowing is far from a trivial nuisance for targeted firms, and on average, appears to be a useful mechanism for uncovering agency issues.
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