Institutional arrangements for public debt management

Abstract

This paper analyzes institutional
\n arrangements for public debt management by reviewing the
\n experience of OECD countries during the late 1980s and
\n 1990s. It discusses principal-agent issues arising from the
\n delegation of authority from the Minister of Finance to the
\n debt management office and describes how countries have
\n designed governance structures and control and monitoring
\n mechanisms to deal with these issues. The paper also
\n discusses what lessons emerging market countries and
\n transition countries can draw from the experience of
\n advanced OECD countries. The OECD experience clearly
\n indicates that-regardless of whether the debt management
\n office is located inside or outside the Ministry of
\n Finance-four issues are of vital importance: 1) Giving
\n priority to strategic public policy objectives rather than
\n tactical trading objectives. 2) Strengthening the
\n institutional capacity to deal with financial portfolio
\n management and with the public policy aspects of debt
\n management. 3) Modernizing debt management. 4) Creating
\n mechanisms to ensure successful delegation and
\n accountability to the Ministry of Finance and Parliament.