European Finance Review · 2011 · 213 citations · 57 references
BusinessCorporate GovernanceFinanceCapital StructureCorporate FinanceFinancial EconomicsBond MarketsCapital MarketsCapital Structure DeterminantsCapital Structure TheoryCost Of DebtFinancial RiskAgency Conflicts Between BondholdersCorporate Bond PricingCorporate Debt FinancingCorporate Financing BehaviorFinancial Leverage EffectsGovernance MechanismsIndustry CharacteristicsSubordinated Bondholders
Abstract The authors study the impact of a powerful nonfinancial stakeholder—unionized workers—on the pricing of corporate debt. Firms in more unionized industries have lower bond yields. This relation is stronger in firms with weaker financial conditions and cannot be explained by the correlation of unionization with industry characteristics, governance mechanisms, or financial leverage. Firms in unionized industries implement less risky investment policies and are less likely targets of acquisitions. Unionization reduces yields by more when firms’ takeover barriers are lower. Hence, unions are viewed favorably in the bond market because, through their influence on corporate affairs, they protect bondholders’ wealth.
57
Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
James J. Heckman · Econometrica · 1979 · 28.9K citations
ON THE PRICING OF CORPORATE DEBT: THE RISK STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES*
Robert C. Merton · The Journal of Finance · 1974 · 11K citations · Full text
Business, Finance, Asset Pricing +16
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny · Journal of Political Economy · 1986 · 8.6K citations