Ownership and Control of German Corporations

TLDR

In Germany, ownership‑control links resemble those in the UK and US, and while a share‑block market can shift control, benefits are confined to large‑block holders and do not favor minority investors. The study shows that board turnover strongly predicts corporate performance, ownership concentration has little effect on managerial discipline, pyramid structures rarely aid control, dynamic ownership transfers differ markedly, and overall control changes yield limited benefits while private control advantages are exploited.

Abstract

In a study of the ownership of German corporations, we find a strong relation between board turnover and corporate performance, little association of concentrations of ownership with managerial disciplining, and only limited evidence that pyramid structures can be used for control purposes. The static relationship of ownership to control in Germany is therefore similar to the United Kingdom and the United States. However, there are marked differences in dynamic relations involving transfers of ownership. There is an active market in share blocks giving rise to changes in control, but the gains are limited and accrue solely to the holders of large blocks, not to minority investors. We provide evidence of low overall benefits to control changes and the exploitation of private benefits of control.