The Journal of Finance · 2010 · 1.9K citations · 50 references
BusinessAccountancyCorporate GovernanceAuditingCorporate AccountabilityCorporate ReportingCorporate Governance MechanismsFinancial Statement FraudFraud DetectionFraud ReportingReputation ManagementWhistleblowingFalse Reporting RisksFraud Detection IncentivesMonetary Rewards For WhistleblowersRegulatorsReputational PressureWhistleblowing In Auditing
The study aims to identify the most effective mechanisms for detecting corporate fraud by analyzing all reported fraud cases in large U.S. companies from 1996 to 2004. The authors conduct an in‑depth analysis of every reported fraud case in large U.S.
To identify the most effective mechanisms for detecting corporate fraud we study in depth all reported fraud cases in large U.S. companies between 1996 and 2004. We find that fraud detection does not rely on obvious actors (investors, SEC, and auditors), but takes a village of several non-traditional players (employees, media, and industry regulators). Having access to information or monetary rewards has a significant impact on the probability a stakeholder becomes a whistleblower. Reputational incentives do not work as well. Yet, after SOX auditors' reputation pays off in new client business, increasing their willingness to reveal fraud.
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