Financial Review · 2006 · 53 citations · 34 references
ManagementBusiness AdministrationCorporate GovernanceAgency TheoryCorporate FinanceCorporate StrategyBoard Decision-makingBoard GovernanceBoard IndependenceBoard OversightBoard ResponsibilitiesBoard StructureBoard Governance EffectivenessBoard Governance QualityExecutive Replacement ProcessesFirm Financial PerformanceFirm PerformanceStock Price Reaction Analysis
Abstract We examine board quality and executive replacement decisions around deaths of senior executives. Stock price reactions to executive deaths are positively related to board independence. Controlling for such factors as the deceased's stockholdings, outside blockholdings, board size, and whether the deceased was a founder, board independence is the most significant factor explaining abnormal returns. Board independence is particularly important when there is no apparent successor and firm performance is poor. The results are consistent with independent boards being reluctant to discipline poorly performing incumbent managers, but nevertheless using the opportunity of an executive death to improve the quality of management.
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Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny · Journal of Political Economy · 1986 · 8.6K citations
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Michael S. Weisbach · Journal of Financial Economics · 1988 · 4.4K citations
Management, Corporate Governance, Organizational Behavior +12