Publication | Open Access
Equilibrium concepts for time‐inconsistent stopping problems in continuous time
36
Citations
20
References
2020
Year
Optimal Mild EquilibriumStochastic GameEquilibrium ProblemGame TheoryStrong EquilibriumMild EquilibriumGamesTimed SystemEquilibrium ConceptsStochastic DynamicMarkov Decision ProcessStability
Abstract A new notion of equilibrium, which we call strong equilibrium , is introduced for time‐inconsistent stopping problems in continuous time. Compared to the existing notions introduced in Huang, Y.‐J., & Nguyen‐Huu, A. (2018, Jan 01). Time‐consistent stopping under decreasing impatience. Finance and Stochastics , 22(1), 69–95 and Christensen, S., & Lindensjö, K. (2018). On finding equilibrium stopping times for time‐inconsistent markovian problems. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization , 56(6), 4228–4255, which in this paper are called mild equilibrium and weak equilibrium , respectively, a strong equilibrium captures the idea of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium more accurately. When the state process is a continuous‐time Markov chain and the discount function is log subadditive, we show that an optimal mild equilibrium is always a strong equilibrium. Moreover, we provide a new iteration method that can directly construct an optimal mild equilibrium and thus also prove its existence.
| Year | Citations | |
|---|---|---|
Page 1
Page 1