Losing Ourselves: Active Inference, Depersonalization, and Meditation

George Deane, Mark Miller, Sam Wilkinson

Frontiers in Psychology · 2020 · 88 citations · 69 references

DOIFull text

Open access

Concepts

TL;DR

Disruptions of ordinary selfhood underlie both pathological depersonalization, marked by alienation and hopelessness, and sought‑after meditative self‑less states associated with peace and joy, yet the conceptual link between these contrasting experiences remains unclear. The authors aim to unify depersonalization and meditative self‑less experiences within an active inference framework and examine their therapeutic implications. They model selfhood as emerging from a temporally deep generative model that tunes agents to counterfactual action possibilities, and suggest depersonalization arises from inferred loss of allostatic control, contrasting with meditative self‑less states. The study demonstrates that an active inference model of self‑modeling clarifies similarities and differences between depersonalization and meditative self‑less states, offering insights into dissociative disorders and highlighting both therapeutic benefits and potential risks of meditation.

Abstract

Disruptions in the ordinary sense of selfhood underpin both pathological and 'enlightened' states of consciousness. People suffering from depersonalization can experience the loss of a sense of self as devastating, often accompanied by intense feelings of alienation, fear and hopelessness. However, for meditative contemplatives from various traditions, "selfless" experiences are highly sought after, being associated with enduring peace and joy. Little is understood about how these contrasting dysphoric and euphoric experiences should be conceptualised. In this paper, we propose a unified account of these selfless experiences within the active inference framework. Building on our recent active inference research we propose an account of the experiences of selfhood as emerging from a temporally deep generative model. We go onto develop a view of the self as playing a central role in structuring ordinary experience by 'tuning' agents to the counterfactually rich possibilities for action. Finally, we explore how depersonalization may result from an inferred loss of allostatic control, and contrast this phenomenology with selfless experiences reported by meditation practitioners. We will show how, by beginning with a conception of self-modeling within an active inference framework, we have available to us a new way of conceptualizing the striking experiential similarities and important differences between these selfless experiences within a unifying theoretical framework. We will explore the implications for understanding and treating dissociative disorders, as well as elucidate both the therapeutic potential, and possible dangers, of meditation.

References

69