Post-socialist “illiberal democracies”: do de jure constitutional rights matter?

Abstract

Abstract Are de jure constitutional rules significant for constitutional practice? We pose this question with regard to de jure and de facto protection of constitutional rights in post-socialist countries of Europe and Asia. While, after 1989, these countries enacted broad catalogues of rights and freedoms, they are by now often regarded as electoral, not liberal democracies, i.e. they generally allow for political competition and fair elections but witness considerable violations in civil and minority rights. We use various econometric techniques to determine whether, and under what conditions, de jure rights originating from texts of post-socialist constitutions matter for de facto protection of rights in these countries. Our results reveal no such significant unconditional effect, with the exception of freedom of assembly/association. We do, however, find a positive significant effect conditional on judicial independence, democratization level, and robustness of civil society. The conclusions allow to propose guidelines for post-socialist legislators and bring a contribution to the broader debate on the role of de jure constitutional rules for their de facto equivalents, which has so far been essentially inconclusive.