Dialogue, Philosophy, and Rhetoric: The Example of Plato's Gorgias

Steven F. Rendall

Philosophy and Rhetoric · 1977 · 13 citations · 1 references

Concepts

Abstract

In his recent article in Philosophy and Rhetoric on philosophical dialogue, Albert William Levi does not discuss at length Plato's use of form because, as he says, the subject is so obvious . . . and so rieh that to deal with it properly would demand many papers exclusively devoted to theme (p. 15).1 I offer present essay as a contribution to study of this rieh subject. While Gorgias will provide my point of departure and principal example, I shall also try to show how my observations may add to our understanding of history and rhetoric of dialogue form in generai. The subject of Gorgias, as is well known, is rhetoric, and more particularly persuasive as distinguished from bad or false rhetoric practiced by Gorgias and his followers. For Piato or perhaps I should say, for Socrates dialectic is true art of persuasion, and it is inseparable from dialogue, for reasons I shall try to make clear. The Gorgias may be viewed, then, as an exploration not only of rhetoric, but of nature of philosophical dialogue. Toward end of dialogue, Callicles, last of Socrates' three main interlocutors, refuses to answer questions asked of him. Socrates at first tries to maintain dialogue form by answering his own questions, but is eventually forced to abandon this artificial imitation, and delivers a long speech. Dialogue has thus degenerated into monologue, as Socrates himself acknowledges in brief interchange which occurs at end of his speech:

References

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