Peer-to-Peer Energy Sharing With Social Attributes: A Stochastic Leader–Follower Game Approach

TLDR

Distributed energy resources create complex socio‑technical systems as more prosumers with strong social attributes join P2P markets, yet prior studies have largely ignored these social factors. The study proposes an interdisciplinary P2P energy sharing framework that integrates technical and sociological aspects. The framework models prosumers as followers using prospect‑theory‑based risk‑utility utilities and an ESP leader with dynamic pricing, solved via a Markov‑decision‑process aggregation and differential‑evolution algorithm that overcomes dimensionality and discreteness. Numerical results show a Stackelberg equilibrium that captures prosumers’ radical behavior when losing and conservative behavior when gaining, confirming the method’s effectiveness.

Abstract

Distributed energy resources bring about challenges related to the participation of an increasing number of prosumers with strong social attributes in peer-to-peer (P2P) energy sharing markets, resulting in the increased complexity of socio-technical systems. Previous research has focused on energy sharing analysis based on rational games without considering the social attributes of prosumers, which are not typically used in real scenarios. In this article, an interdisciplinary P2P energy sharing framework that considers both technical and sociological aspects is proposed. It is based on prospect theory (PT) and stochastic game theory, in which the prosumers work as followers with subjective load strategies, while an energy sharing provider (ESP) serves as the leader with a dynamic pricing scheme. A subjective utility model with risk utility (RU) determined by PT is designed for prosumers, and a profit model for dynamic prices is suggested for ESP. Moreover, a solution algorithm that consists of interpolation and curve fitting to obtain the RU function, the aggregation of prosumers to a Markov decision process, and a differential evolution algorithm to solve the game are proposed to solve the problems of the "curse of dimensionality" and discreteness arising from the social attributes of prosumers. Numerical analysis reveals the results of the Stackelberg equilibrium and demonstrates the effectiveness of this method in terms of the social behavior of prosumers, i.e., radicalness when losing and conservatism when gaining.