Getting the measure of Murdoch's Good

Abstract

“It is the traditional inspiration of the philosopher, but also his traditional vice, to believe that all is one” Murdoch ‘On ‘God’ and ‘Good” In the first essay in The Sovereignty of Good, ‘The Idea of Perfection’, Murdoch deploys a bit of an arcane idiom that is easy to pass over without much hesitation. With only a few exceptions, the passage in which it appears, close to the start of the part of the essay that sees Murdoch develop her positive proposal, has drawn little critical assessment.11 Some exceptions are McBay Merritt (2017, p. 9) and Bagnoli (2012, p. 222). I will use the abbreviations (IP) for ‘The Idea of Perfection’; (GG) for ‘On “God” and ‘Good”; (SGC) for ‘The Sovereignty of the Good over Other Concepts’. MGM stands for Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, and E&M for Existentialists and Mystics (1999). Murdoch's alternative ‘soul-picture’ is pitched against a neo-Kantian existentialist, behaviourist position (whose ethics and politics are utilitarian and “democratic” p. 9) which she sees as fuelled by a genetic—and, for her, faulty—analysis of concepts: Concepts are understood to have a structure that is public, the grasp of which is a skill; ordinary words for concepts are learned from observation of some ‘typical outward behavior pattern’; in the case of moral concepts, ‘to copy a right action is to act rightly’. This latter is the view of Stuart Hampshire to whom Sovereignty is dedicated; but, she writes, while ‘this is all very well to say’, the question still arises: ‘What is the form that I am supposed to copy?’22 Bob Stern notes in email correspondence that Kant expresses the same worry about moral exemplars in the Groundwork 4:408–409—could it be that Murdoch is thinking here of Kant? (p. 30). She finds she wants to attack this ‘heavily fortified’ (p. 16) position: ‘I am not content’ (p. 16). Her alternative will be sketched out, although incompletely, in the rest of the paper. For now, a partial summary: Concepts have a complicated structure, a grasp of which is private and necessarily fallible. There is no skill a public display of which is a criterion of concept possession. Instead, concepts shift and alter—“we have a different image of courage at forty from that which we had at twenty” (p. 29). Words may mislead here; “words are often stable while concepts alter” (p. 29). Concepts deepen. They acquire structure over time, their interrelations shift and ramify but always in ways that are personal. This is because concepts that historical individuals have—and express in thought and action—only acquire structure in the context of the progressing life of a person (p. 26); the full extent of what courage is for me and means to me will depend on the historical individual I am and the life I have led. But unlike the existentialist Kantian ego, which appears only at crucial moments of choice, quick as the flash of needle,33 See ‘On God and Good’ (1970, p. 53) the progress of the life of a person, someone with a ‘live personality’, involves more than outward behaviour. It involves inner, private conscious reflective activity. It involves the continuous reassessment of past events, relationships and individuals. And, as concepts deepen, it involves redescription (p. 26)—what looked courageous at twenty may seem foolhardy at forty. Such reassessment and the redescription that it involves is moral work; it is an attempt to see and understand things clearly. It is not a skill that can be exercised at isolated moments but an endless task, one that is regulated by the eponymous ideal limit—the idea of perfection. For instance, a perfected idea of courage would be a full understanding of what ‘courage’ is, its relation to other the virtues and to human life, an understanding that is unattainable, try as the historical individual imperfectly may. This activity is not parasitic on the outside. It is serious. You have to do it for yourself, if not by yourself. None of what I am saying here is particularly new: similar things have been said by philosophers from Plato onward; and appear as commonplaces of the Christian ethic, whose centre is an individual. To come nearer home in the Platonic tradition, the present dispute is reminiscent of the old arguments about abstract and concrete universals. My view might be put by saying: moral terms must be treated as concrete universals. And if someone at this point were to say, well, why stop at moral concepts, why not claim that all universals are concrete, I would reply, why not indeed? Why not consider red as an ideal end-point, as a concept infinitely to be learned, as an individual object of love? (p. 29) In this paper, I hardly talk about love, something that is so central to Murdoch's alternative ‘soul-picture.’ Instead, I say something about her easy-to-miss appeal to the concrete universal, a notion now almost banished from contemporary discussion For there is reason to think that Murdoch's conception of the concrete universal is inflected more by British Idealism than by Hegel directly, although this inflection is not explicit (“I am not, in spite of the philosophical backing which I might here resort to, suggesting anything in the least esoteric”, p. 30)—and this difference is philosophically significant. But, as I show, it is also inflected by Wittgenstein in ways I try to illustrate in the middle part of the paper. Following Murdoch's tendency, method even, I draw an analogy. I want to suggest that Wittgenstein's discussion of the Standard Metre in the Philosophical Investigations helps us to get the measure of what Murdoch is up to with her talk of ‘concrete universality’ and ultimately too of the Good, more a concern of the other two papers that make up Sovereignty: ‘On ‘God’ and ‘Good”, and ‘The Sovereignty of the Good over Other Concepts’ as well her of 1992 masterpiece Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. I then introduce a hopefully not terminal problem for my exegesis and so for the analogy: Murdoch is not wholly sympathetic to all aspects of Wittgenstein's programme. In the last part of the paper, I offer a way around this problem by picking up a different Wittgensteinean strand. This could have been lifted from Murdoch's own work, but instead I appeal to Chapter of The of Metaphysics by Murdoch's while an at of at This in in and and in Murdoch's at her copy with its on of Her Metaphysics as a Guide to were in and is not but his of and Idea of first in and has been on and Murdoch's and I can only at a that is I think by the of my and by the passage around which the In Murdoch in her that she has the of she had been for her it the her had had on the as only by two other one of whom I at the Murdoch in for with this on the passage to Why moral with the Murdoch is to the problem of although this might not at be from its will to this in I up her to the This problem what something individual an a from other individuals. could all the same might be have the and so might be in all over and the of have been and The notion of a to the latter as what is the way the are are appeal to a to what are is what two individuals a is a we is the that and with one But, of the something concrete, is not on the it also has a a and all of other which are not the the other the something universal, not to this For there are other and other that are also red p. in Stern human infinitely is so because she is a human and individual is an individual because it is an if this is then it would be to say what an individual could still be if this were no the individual might be with other that is, this can be a of in Stern are They are They are not a way an individual may be but what the individual is They can of is a and that not from its is They can be in individuals that have different contemporary of this view can be in the of and although do not as I the idiom of the For see Stern See also But, now, this notion a if concern to up Murdoch up to And this to home is at least Murdoch exegesis is This is as Stern here my is to British conception of the concrete universal, while is not two are and their relation is not I am a I I what I and I am not in I am with and the relation But no I reply, can what is, and the idea that all his his is as is, to his own would with that to pass in For a would and from on to has red and would not in the and in the can be and than the is an from the an more and the more the and are and depend for their always on a a which and which always more in the in Stern I say a little about the and as as Murdoch's in although I say at all about the of individuals in which to I Bob Stern for this which is to an of the position I in this but that I do not For now, I will make a that Stern from and that is, I a See I it all of the of the The British of the concrete universal as universal in the form of a than in the form of a the universal has the form of a and individuals it are and See Stern by a continuous of of are not and be in this the not an but an some almost p. It might be Murdoch is Hegel for of all is an endless and a and it not by but the to its It is a in this it for what p. is to and in In we might draw on her as well as her 1992 on and Murdoch Hegel and she the the what of his might have the in her notes that she is by p. the is also a to Murdoch to Hegel the present would she have been in all I have to Murdoch's of this is to correspondence with Bob Stern over the of and on the present I only to Murdoch's not Murdoch but not the thought that all terms might be treated as concrete I think it not much to the grasp of red be and by conscious on and to red in the an she in the The to and and But what is for the concept is complicated and an with all the and and and in of all in all and in things and much more The as an individual object to be infinitely learned and his her own grasp of it as infinitely But is an abstract universal for I some to the thought that Murdoch's concrete universal is in the form of an in the form of a but are for This is the Murdoch is first to Wittgenstein's of the Philosophical Investigations are to her by In she it in a to a is on to And she helps with aspects of the which appears in has of that his and of particularly of may have for Wittgenstein's See It is to Murdoch's of might not have her of also on is a question then to what extent of particularly in has And with that in we can although this moral The on is of of the that but the is words the same this may mislead the concepts words by a historical over the of a life and acquire But on this concepts are concept that an use of a expresses on an is a of the This understanding of concepts and words as of concepts that are with the of behaviourist in words outward But it also from an to understood as an that can (p. 29). is ordinary for what words as an individual life It may seem to the idea of to the idea of is an and what of it can is it to measure and things to In which us I think we would say understanding of of human activity for involves an of of and often a of there in little that is very and that is understanding of human in a similar come to and may to see as than what we were to The idea of a of an of The idea of is also a of In its we come to see that which is than And this can must without the idea in In it is in its that we get it This is the of the of the p. the idea of and the Good are has the of The idea of us in the of the idea I say more about the relation the idea of and the Good I understand For now, Murdoch's at that ‘to copy a right action is to act rightly’. There to be here by Murdoch's I to which action is right is an which human if not is the form that I am supposed to I to what I at a context problem which is by of and and by And are at an concept is by a of concepts as private concrete a historical not a Kantian to copy that which with as For instance, ‘I want to To Murdoch's way of that is all very well to be in question the of and there is only the idea of the which not so much as And too in the of human has to do the and (p. the point is that one be what is, a There is one of which one can say that it is a that it is not one and that is the Standard Metre in But this is, of not to to but only to its in the of with a p. of the problem which is Wittgenstein is, of that this as a of and so we to this as it may it may not is the is one a its might in could make the more by that one is to be the of at it then a that is one at that one a is might is the of a is one at a But there to me no reason so to for a the of For this not to the of what the but to the There is a which wants to it by an that there is a of that might the same by But in this to the of his of a can still say, if had been to this at then at would not have been one for two at least so as Wittgenstein exegesis Wittgenstein's point the in the of with a But also an about the of the notion of to There is something about the person in to the question are their on their and Why the one seem to have a notion of as something that can be of without appeal to a that is in with some other seem to that their is the of the something which has a the other that is a are to have only in relation to other with that can be a that The of the present case then is that the is his as his her own but this a in the of which involves of other It is that has an conception of in that we use a to a at which we as the Standard It is a that the Standard Metre is a although it only had that could have But what the of the case is that we This is because the Standard Metre only has in the context of that have a of up other and must be And other with and and and make But the same is of the concept this the concept has no life of there is no notion that of can be said to as a And the conception is crucial for I to For now, I the I have in a I is only form a They are all individuals that are of the universal understood universal is not a way individuals could be a that other things It is what This not say anything about the of the Standard as a in the But we could all individuals are Some are and individuals so about the of and so as the the the Wittgensteinean in the is not on individual things could be one way on of things but on the of life in which things and which come to the form of a In the case of the Standard there are of life that are in of it and that can on because of there is, in this an the of and up and so on that make up the which the Standard Metre is, there is an the in the up the and the and her this other are to the Standard and have a not because form a but because are the of life that the Standard Metre and the in which and make Murdoch that it is to measure and things to But unlike the of something that can be at least by one in the form of life a is it is often not to if something is form am I supposed to be But of can us in some of and of Murdoch the same time, that and with the progress of a have a different image of courage at than I had at But the that and that not to be to form a do not For Bob a Wittgensteinean would use the notion of the idea of The concept of a might be treated as a concrete universal as all its concrete be to a of and although all in some It is that the not up so with this alternative as it might be thought that a not for a is to the in The way I pitched the with the is, a which is the conception is, I to be it is that different are individual as are of the universal, which is But my to a conception of a universal in the form of a a Wittgensteinean the idea of a is treated as what and a of and the and virtues and moral concepts with this while there is no a an the in a and an at not for a because of a to events, and are different way of this same thought is to consider what of human life would with the of the concept of a It is hardly a is, to, on this is not to a of whose might the I come to see as as my idea of courage And I come to see that as to and I see and their against the in which which I also come to in and looked My that is, and it But it also For as part of this some are as reassessment redescription looked courageous And this is endless and And for the is of what is the is There is a more to say have to a very I have But I want to the and for This is because it is easy to at a problem for my exegesis and least so as the Wittgensteinean of Murdoch's concrete universal are Good as courage and and all the virtues is to be as and a the which the virtues to other in moral In the the which us from and are to idea of it in a the of p. I say anything about Murdoch's but it she of the of the Good to be This is with a view of human which the she the very of this is for Murdoch of the of the But now, a for the I am My way of the measure of Murdoch's Good on the notion of a form of Standard Metre is that in of which of life are and But, in Metaphysics as Guide to Morals, Murdoch is critical of this notion and in a way that is more than reminiscent of her of are (p. Wittgenstein's Investigations is as much a as the is a of (p. of life a of as a which is instead infinitely (p. concept the of the (p. the problem of discussion the same time, Murdoch also to Wittgenstein a of moral that is to not try to own p. It might be thought that Murdoch is this and is a to Wittgenstein this is not his For discussion of this see But what Murdoch to is a philosophical She Wittgenstein is a philosophical that the and of To see the of it is to to an passage that almost has the now of least in Murdoch Murdoch what she the of moral She is a of and then to the and p. she is the that moral to and to And it is what her own of Wittgenstein The philosophical Wittgenstein up a the behaviourist existentialist for whom is and the will is the of concepts: of the Good, love, and But this not to a way of the but as of a way of in a that is of moral concern p. And this is if I am on the right the way in which a person to the and is not understood as a It is by to see the in of it is by the in terms of what the Wittgenstein's philosophical the way it up by things in a way that and so their But this way of Murdoch's a different way of the that I think the of the historical individual from the and of of To to the passage that this the might now see that I have a Murdoch that she is saying is she notes that similar things are commonplaces of Christian ethic, whose centre is an In what way might an be It might be thought that moral exemplars are historical individuals that are central to an as are to be are as the to But the I am something and I draw on The of Metaphysics to a which in my view Metaphysics as a Guide to a in the Plato of the that the may be as it is that have for the of in of the of But in the that his are Plato is of his as a way of at the p. it the as a a in which the of British and had been so that I had of this I the and which had the with the of his I that it there that had his I the and I that my by of the I had I might say that ‘I the as I and in the of the of by the of human and would not to say that the had an for the the of the by us so to see so not by the of what but by his as a on the whose are there his p. this the the way of his an for the that would not have been the centre of the Christian is not treated as a moral his life is not an of a to be Instead, it is as a the a way of of the life of as the of the life of as a means of to see the in a on human a that is only the action of the individual whom in it is (p. Murdoch's is but her of the of as well as of of and in is as p. with this conception in ways I can only at and make for us of as well of And do this not because illustrate to be because of what show, but because of what The of the can be and can be in of it is by the form of work, an of a historical individual as it might a of This Murdoch's for in and her which I that and have a in a to to a for is But also and which is is so at the of that is to And that is as Murdoch we must by always more than we of is and always which is why are infinitely In the case of Wittgenstein's the way in which his philosophical this is as a method in for the of a central of moral and the the same time, Murdoch I have a very and to Murdoch's conception of the concrete universal, although only to more than I can To that I want to say something in about Murdoch's that I at least some of the still the paper. I am on the right Murdoch's on the concrete universal is inflected by Wittgenstein and British the latter is we not to be to of the also Murdoch's it is here of that the of and progress have a I have without the that concepts are to for are ways of that can be philosophical the of individuals and have a to not because illustrate to copy but because of the ways in which make the in of and the of life and make I all discussion of the of the that the concrete For if the image of her that I am is to have and is to make her and moral at least some of the that concepts must be are and from other individuals and are and is but a of the and to is See and the and and the in But to this there are aspects of the of the that we would do well to for it is which we as for it is which we to put the and by whose we to and Some are are by a love, are the of a and for there are of In the that make can at only make for of are often and of and to with an of p. the same time, Murdoch it that we do have an conception of the And this is she with The Good is are of its and in its human infinitely we its This is is more than is p. I Bob Stern for his and for their on with which I think to so much in for me with in the Murdoch am so my and and in the the and at the Murdoch in and particularly and and for on all of this over