Attacking Key Management in Ransomware

Abstract

Ransomware have observed a steady growth over the years with several concerning trends that indicate efficient, targeted attacks against organizations and individuals alike. These opportunistic attackers indiscriminately target both public and private sector entities to maximize gain. In this article, we highlight the criticality of key management in ransomware's cryptosystem in order to facilitate building effective solutions against this threat. We introduce the ransomware kill chain to elucidate the path our adversaries must take to attain their malicious objective. We examine current solutions presented against ransomware in light of this kill chain and specify which constraints on ransomware are being violated by the existing solutions. Finally, we present the notion of memory attacks against ransomware's key management and present our initial experiments with dynamically extracting decryption keys from real-world ransomware. Results of our preliminary research are promising and the extracted keys were successfully deployed in subsequent data decryption.