Salient Alternatives in Perspective

Mikkel Gerken, Chad Gonnerman, Joshua Alexander, John Philip Waterman

Australasian Journal of Philosophy · 2020 · 51 citations · 27 references

Concepts

Abstract

This paper empirically investigates how perspective bears on putative salient alternative effects on knowledge ascriptions. Some theoretical accounts predict salient alternative effects in both first- and third-person perspective conditions. These include semantic accounts such as contextualism [Lewis 1996 Lewis, D. 1996. Elusive Knowledge, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74/4: 549–67. doi: 10.1080/00048409612347521[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; DeRose 2009 DeRose, K. 2009. The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1, Oxford: Clarendon Press.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]] and psychological accounts such as the epistemic focal bias account [Gerken 2013 Gerken, M. 2013. Epistemic Focal Bias, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91/1: 41–61. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2011.631020[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], 2017 Gerken, M. 2017. On Folk Epistemology. How We Think and Talk about Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar]]. In contrast, other psychological accounts, such as the egocentric bias account [Nagel, 2010 Nagel, J. 2010. Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking about Error, The Philosophical Quarterly 60/239: 286–306. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.624.x[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]; Alexander et al. 2014 Alexander, J., C. Gonnerman, and J. Waterman 2014. Salience and Epistemic Egocentrism: An Empirical Study, in Advances in Experimental Epistemology, ed. J. Beebe, London: Bloomsbury: 97–118. [Google Scholar]] and the deference account [Turri 2017 Turri, J. 2017. Epistemic Contextualism: An Idle Hypothesis, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95/1: 141–56. doi: 10.1080/00048402.2016.1153684[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]], only have clear predictions in third-person perspective conditions. Our study provides evidence of a salient alternative effect of the same magnitude in both first and third-person conditions. Thus, the study provides empirical evidence that might help to adjudicate between competing accounts in the literature on salient alternatives.

References

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