Base Institutionnelle de Recherche de l'université Paris-Dauphine (BIRD) (University Paris-Dauphine) · 2022 · 23 citations · 22 references
Open access
Social SciencesPolitical ScienceCommittee SystemsElectoral PoliticsPublic Choice TheoryElectionsGeneral ElectionsVoting BehaviorVoting RulesVoting TheoryAxiomsMonotonicity AssumptionMonotonicity ConditionsMultiwinner VotingPolynomial Time ComplexityPolynomial-time Algorithms
In the apportionment problem, a fixed number of seats must be distributed among parties in proportion to the number of voters supporting each party. We study a generalization of this setting, in which voters can support multiple parties by casting approval ballots. This approval-based apportionment setting generalizes traditional apportionment and is a natural restriction of approval-based multiwinner elections, where approval ballots range over individual candidates instead of parties. Using techniques from both apportionment and multiwinner elections, we identify rules that generalize the D’Hondt apportionment method and that satisfy strong axioms which are generalizations of properties commonly studied in the apportionment literature. In fact, the rules we discuss provide representation guarantees that are currently out of reach in the general setting of multiwinner elections: First, we show that core-stable committees are guaranteed to exist and can be found in polynomial time. Second, we demonstrate that extended justified representation is compatible with committee monotonicity (also known as house monotonicity).
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Justified representation in approval-based committee voting
Haris Aziz, Markus Brill, Vincent Conitzer et al. · Social Choice and Welfare · 2017 · 262 citations
The Nash Social Welfare Function
Mamoru Kaneko, Kenjiro Nakamura · Econometrica · 1979 · 235 citations
A minimax procedure for electing committees
Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour, M. Remzi Sanver · Public Choice · 2007 · 164 citations · Full text