SAIDuCANT: Specification-Based Automotive Intrusion Detection Using Controller Area Network (CAN) Timing

Abstract

The proliferation of embedded devices in modern vehicles has opened the traditionally-closed vehicular system to the risk of cybersecurity attacks through physical and remote access to the in-vehicle network such as the controller area network (CAN). The CAN bus does not implement a security protocol that can protect the vehicle against the increasing cyber and physical attacks. To address this risk, we introduce a novel algorithm to extract the real-time model parameters of the CAN bus and develop SAIDuCANT, a specification-based intrusion detection system (IDS) using anomaly-based supervised learning with the real-time model as input. We evaluate the effectiveness of SAIDuCANT with real CAN logs collected from two passenger cars and on an open-source CAN dataset collected from real-world scenarios. Experimental results show that SAIDuCANT can effectively detect data injection attacks with low false positive rates. Over four real attack scenarios from the open-source dataset, SAIDuCANT observes at most one false positive before detecting an attack whereas other detection approaches using CAN timing features detect on average more than a hundred false positives before a real attack occurs.