Game theoretical inference of human behavior in social networks

Abstract

Social networks emerge as a result of actors' linking decisions. We propose a game-theoretical model of socio-strategic network formation on directed weighted graphs, in which every actors' benefit is a parametric trade-off between centrality measure, brokerage opportunities, clustering coefficient, and sociological network patterns. We use two different stability definitions to infer individual behavior of homogeneous, rational agents from network structure, and to quantify the impact of cooperation. Our theoretical analysis confirms results known for specific network motifs studied previously in isolation, yet enables us to precisely quantify the trade-offs in the space of user preferences. To deal with complex networks of heterogeneous and irrational actors, we construct a statistical behavior estimation method using Nash equilibrium conditions. We provide evidence that our results are consistent with empirical, historical, and sociological observations on real-world data-sets. Furthermore, our method offers sociological and strategic interpretations of random networks models, such as preferential attachment and small-world networks.