Timing Channel in IaaS: How to Identify and Investigate

Xiao Fu, Rui Yang, Xiaojiang Du, Bin Luo, Mohsen Guizani

IEEE Access · 2018 · 200 citations · 17 references

DOIFull text

Open access

Concepts

TL;DR

Infrastructure as a Service clouds such as Amazon EC2 are widely used, yet security threats like covert timing channels that enable cross‑VM information leakage remain difficult to detect with conventional methods. The study aims to characterize timing channel behavior by analyzing memory activity records and deriving a signature for these covert channels. An identification framework based on long‑term memory activity signatures and a complete forensic workflow—evidence extraction, identification, record preservation, and reporting—was developed. Experiments on four representative timing channels demonstrated that the proposed method can detect and investigate these channels despite interference from normal processes.

Abstract

Recently, the Infrastructure as a Service Cloud (IaaS) (e.g., Amazon EC2) has been widely used by many organizations. However, some IaaS security issues create serious threats to its users. A typical issue is the timing channel. This kind of channel can be a cross-VM information channel, as proven by many researchers. Owing to the fact that it is covert and traceless, the traditional identification methods cannot build an accurate analysis model and obtain a compromised result. We investigated the underlying behavior of the timing channel from the perspective of the memory activity records and summarized the signature of the timing channel in the underlying memory activities. An identification method based on the long-term behavior signatures was proposed. We proposed a complete set of forensics steps including evidence extraction, identification, record reserve, and evidence reports. We studied four typical timing channels, and the experiments showed that these channels can be detected and investigated, even with the disturbances from normal processes.

References

17