IEEE Access · 2018 · 200 citations · 17 references
ComputingCloud ComputingComputer ScienceCloud InfrastructureCloud SecurityComputer SecurityCloud ForensicsComputer ForensicsMemory ForensicsSide-channel AnalysisCloud Log AnalysisCloud Memory ForensicsEvidence ExtractionMemory Artifact AnalysisTimingTiming AttacksTiming Side-channel Analysis
Infrastructure as a Service clouds such as Amazon EC2 are widely used, yet security threats like covert timing channels that enable cross‑VM information leakage remain difficult to detect with conventional methods. The study aims to characterize timing channel behavior by analyzing memory activity records and deriving a signature for these covert channels. An identification framework based on long‑term memory activity signatures and a complete forensic workflow—evidence extraction, identification, record preservation, and reporting—was developed. Experiments on four representative timing channels demonstrated that the proposed method can detect and investigate these channels despite interference from normal processes.
Recently, the Infrastructure as a Service Cloud (IaaS) (e.g., Amazon EC2) has been widely used by many organizations. However, some IaaS security issues create serious threats to its users. A typical issue is the timing channel. This kind of channel can be a cross-VM information channel, as proven by many researchers. Owing to the fact that it is covert and traceless, the traditional identification methods cannot build an accurate analysis model and obtain a compromised result. We investigated the underlying behavior of the timing channel from the perspective of the memory activity records and summarized the signature of the timing channel in the underlying memory activities. An identification method based on the long-term behavior signatures was proposed. We proposed a complete set of forensics steps including evidence extraction, identification, record reserve, and evidence reports. We studied four typical timing channels, and the experiments showed that these channels can be detected and investigated, even with the disturbances from normal processes.
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