Automated Behavioral Analysis of Malware: A Case Study of WannaCry Ransomware

Qian Chen, Robert A. Bridges

2017 · 225 citations · 19 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Ransomware such as WannaCry poses a severe cyber threat, and defending against it typically requires laborious analysis of high‑volume system logs and sandbox executions. The study aims to extract and rank discriminating ransomware features from ambient and mixed logs, using only the knowledge that malware was present. The method was evaluated by generating ambient and ransomware‑mixed logs with Cuckoo Sandbox, extracting features, and validating them against a detailed WannaCry analysis while testing robustness to ambient data variations and polymorphic samples. The ranked features automatically reveal malware actions that can automate manual analysis, and the patterns proved accurate even on polymorphic WannaCry copies that evade all 63 tested antivirus products.

Abstract

Ransomware, a class of self-propagating malware that uses encryption to hold the victims' data ransom, has emerged in recent years as one of the most dangerous cyber threats, with widespread damage; e.g., zero-day ransomware WannaCry has caused world-wide catastrophe, from knocking U.K. National Health Service hospitals offline to shutting down a Honda Motor Company in Japan [1]. Our close collaboration with security operations of large enterprises reveals that defense against ransomware relies on tedious analysis from high-volume systems logs of the first few infections. Sandbox analysis of freshly captured malware is also commonplace in operation. We introduce a method to identify and rank the most discriminating ransomware features from a set of ambient (non-attack) system logs and at least one log stream containing both ambient and ransomware behavior. These ranked features reveal a set of malware actions that are produced automatically from system logs, and can help automate tedious manual analysis. We test our approach using WannaCry and two polymorphic samples by producing logs with Cuckoo Sandbox during both ambient, and ambient plus ransomware executions. Our goal is to extract the features of the malware from the logs with only knowledge that malware was present. We compare outputs with a detailed analysis of WannaCry allowing validation of the algorithm's feature extraction and provide analysis of the method's robustness to variations of input data-changing quality/quantity of ambient data and testing polymorphic ransomware. Most notably, our patterns are accurate and unwavering when generated from polymorphic WannaCry copies, on which 63 (of 63 tested) antivirus (AV) products fail.

References

19