Whom to punish? How observers sanction norm‐violating behavior in ostracism situations

Abstract

Abstract When observing ostracism, individuals can either side with the target or the sources of ostracism. Here we demonstrate that side‐taking depends on whether the target previously acted in adherence to or in violation of perceived social norms. In four studies, a target behaved either norm‐consistently or violated a social norm, and was subsequently either excluded by the sources or was not. Next, participants could sanction the behavior of the observed persons by refraining to assign money (Studies 1 and 2), or by subtracting money from a bonus (Studies 3 and 4). Observers assigned less money to the sources when these excluded a norm‐consistent target. However, when the target had violated a social norm before, participants assigned less money to the target instead. These results have far‐reaching implications because the (in)actions of neutral individuals can legitimize the sources’ behavior, or help a target under attack.