2014 · 15 citations · 0 references
Social SciencesNuclear EngineeringInternational SecurityNaval ArchitectureSubsea EngineeringMaritime SecurityNaval WarfareArctic ClimateArctic SecurityMilitary Capabilities DistributionSubmarine Maneuvering
In the last decade, the United States has invested significant sums in its missile defence structure. Elements of this are located in the Arctic (see Figure 7.1). The US has made these investments based partly on existing infrastructure (radar systems in Thule, Greenland, and Clear Air Force Station, Alaska) and partly on geographic considerations (the interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska). Neither these investments nor, for instance, the US Navy’s continued emphasis on exercising its nuclear submarine crews in under-ice operations and its use of the Northwest Passage to transit submarines covertly to and from the Atlantic and Pacific oceans relate directly to the climatic or any other changes taking place in the Arctic, however. The actual investments or decisions to invest in military capabilities aimed at meeting existing and potential challenges in the Arctic have been modest. The most concrete requirement in terms of Arctic capability forwarded not only by the Coast Guard, but also by the combatant commanders and the navy, has been to strengthen the coast guard icebreaker fleet (O’Rourke 2013). The February 2012 decision to fund initial planning for a new coast guard icebreaker represents the most concrete Arctic investment in the US armed services for at least two decades. It is also the only such decision the US seems likely to make in the near future. Thus, while changes in the Arctic have aroused the interest of the US military, and the navy and coast guard in particular, they have yet to trigger major investments. And while the Arctic is an important base for US missile defence, the US primarily sees challenges to societal security emanating from the thawing Arctic. This was evident in the 2011 award of Arctic capability advocacy to US Northern Command (Garamone 2011). The decision was explained with reference to Northern Command’s relations with Canada, the US Department for Homeland Security and the US Coast Guard; “[t]hese relationships are key to human and environmental safety and security concerns, which are relevant in the near term” (DoD 2011: 20).