Accounting and Finance · 2019 · 27 citations · 25 references
Public AffairsBusiness EconomicsPublic FinanceCorporate TaxationTax AvoidanceTaxationLocal Tax AdministrationRegional PolicyAccess To Political InstitutionsLocation EffectsProvincial Tax AdministrationProvincial TaxationRegional Taxation
Abstract This paper investigates the effect of officials’ regional favoritism on corporate tax avoidance activity in China. We find that firms located in regions that were formerly administered by the current provincial governors have a higher level of tax avoidance than other firms in the province. Further evidence indicates that regional favoritism affects tax avoidance through two channels: regional politicians’ personal connections with the governor and firms’ political access to the governor. Overall, the findings support China's current official selection and promotion guidelines that restrict hometown favoritism. Our results further imply that favoritism can also extend to officials’ former administrative regions.
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