Selection and Redistribution in the Irish Tontines of 1773, 1775, and 1777

Abstract

Abstract We construct and analyze a new data set on the mortality experience of the nominees of the 1773, 1775, and 1777 Irish tontines. The active participation of Genevan speculators in these Irish tontines has been well documented. We use our new data to quantify both the extent to which these nominees were longer‐lived and the financial consequences of their enhanced longevity. The Genevan nominees were indeed notably longer‐lived than non‐Genevan nominees—particularly so for the 50 nominees selected by a Genevan investment syndicate. Their enhanced longevity had only trivial financial consequences for the issuer, but it led to significant redistribution from non‐Genevan to Genevan investors. We highlight the implications of this across‐group distributional risk for modern proposals to introduce tontine‐like elements into modern retirement pensions.