Small wars, big data: the information revolution in modern conflict

Abstract

The use of statistics to describe, measure and even combat insurgency and various types of civil disorder is not new in the annals of military history. Today, statistical excursions into the staggering amounts of digitized data produced by contemporary conflict are commonplace. These studies capitalize on the bane of soldiers' existence: the requirement to supply ‘metrics’ to demonstrate how expenditures of material resources or even lives are achieving everything from some narrow goal to the ultimate objective of victory itself. Less frequent, however, is the deliberate articulation of a theory of victory to interpret the value of some particular metric or ‘analysis’ as a way of measuring progress towards overall objectives. Without that type of theory, data, metrics and analysis can actually impede success—this was the hard lesson learned by the ‘Whiz Kids’ of the McNamara Pentagon as US forces fought communist insurgents in Vietnam. Small wars, big data avoids this atheoretical pitfall by advancing an explanation of counter-insurgency to inform its highly sophisticated statistical analysis of some of the millions of gigabytes of data produced by US forces during recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to the authors, at the heart of counter-insurgency is a battle over information. In other words, if insurgents can be identified, located and targeted, government forces that enjoy significant advantages in combat capability can quickly eliminate them. The linchpin in this information war is the civilian population. If civilians flow information to insurgents, government forces will remain vulnerable and stymied. If information flows to the government, the insurgents' days are numbered. To support their theory, the authors test about a dozen propositions to demonstrate how aid programmes, civilian casualties and even cell phone coverage alter the cost–benefit calculations made by civilians when it comes to supplying the government, or the insurgents for that matter, with ‘tips’ about ongoing activities in their locality. Not since Walt Rostow's Stages of economic growth: a non-Communist Manifesto have a group of political economists so bravely entered into the morass to offer insights into pacification—to use a term from a bygone era.